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Institutional Cooperation and 
the Ethical and Religious Directives 
by 
James F. Keenan, S.J. 
The author is Associate Professor of Moral Theology at Weston Jesuit 
School of Theology, Cambridge, MA 
The topic of institutional cooperation has generated a 
considerable discussion among ethicists, bishops and administrators of 
American Catholic health care facilities. In order to advance that 
discussion, I wish to develop several issues related to the topic: 
• the inevitable disagreement that cooperation produces 
• foundational insights for approaching the principle of 
cooperation 
• a brief explanation of the principle 
• a consideration of the cooperating agent and therein an 
appreciation of the breadth of the principle's utility 
• a reflection on why cooperation is important 
• a discussion of the particularly difficult issues of duress, 
immediate material cooperation, and episcopal judgement 
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• a case of immediate material cooperation 
I .. The Inevitable Disagreement 
that Cooperation Produces 
It has always been the case that anyone who engages the 
principle of cooperation is bound to meet with disagreement. The 
disagreement is due to difficulty that arises from differences in 
prudential judgement: inasmuch as the principle concerns how much 
good people ought to be involved in wrong activity, each person has a 
different opinion on the matter. Thus, in asking how to apply the 
principle of cooperation, the English Jesuit moral theologian Henry 
Davis remarked in 1958 there is "no more difficult question than this 
in the whole range of Moral Theology."1 Earlier, in 1923, the famous 
moralist Jerome Noldin noted that the disagreement was not simply 
among those who were unfamiliar with it; on the contrary, Noldin noted 
that it has routinely been granted that this disagreement happens among 
the most competent moral theologians.2 Thus, we find earlier on these 
pages the Reverend Russell E. Smith in disagreement on the topic of 
institutional cooperation with both Professor Germain Grisez and the 
Reverend Richard McCormick. 3 
Certainly, the reason for the renewed interest in the principle of 
cooperation arises from the important role that it plays in assisting those 
responsible for Catholic health care ministry to navigate the complex 
moral, religious and economic issues that emerge in today's highly 
interdependent network of American health care. Anticipating the 
emergence of these issues, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
offered its own "clarification of the terms relative" to the principle of 
cooperation in the Appendix of the Ethical and ReligiOUS Directives 
(hereinafter, ERD).4 
That clarification, like the entire ERD itselr,c tidr rot- o-ccur 
overnight. Rather, only after six years and eleven drafts of ERD was 
the NCCB's Committee on Doctrine ready to offer it to the full 
assembly of bishops. Only then did the Committee members win from 
the assembly of their brother bishops a unanimous vote approving 
ERD's promulgation. To appreciate, then, the fact that complexity and 
disagreement are part and parcel of the principle, a brief review of the 
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bishops' attempts to incorporate the principle into ERD proves itself 
useful. 
Examining those eleven drafts, we find within one of the 
earliest versions a section on cooperation. That version was a modest 
description of each of the principle's conditions. When this draft was 
circulated among a variety of Catholic ethicists, disagreement broke out 
immediately. Progressives assailed it for narrowing the tradition; 
conservatives for expanding it. 
The next draft attempted an even more modest description: a 
virtually skeletal outline. No condition was described: it was simply 
stated. The draft left to individual health care facilities, their ethical 
review boards and diocesan offices the responsibility to apply and 
therefore to interpret the principle. But to this rendition, the bishups 
and health care administrators objected: it was not user friendly. Both 
suggested presenting cases to explain the text. 
To meet this request, the theologians working for the bishops 
contacted colleagues around the world who, like themselves, had 
written on cooperation. Several cases of both personal and institutional 
cooperation were presented. But when faced with these cases, the 
bishops fell into disagreement with one ~mother. Bishops offered their 
differing solutions to each of the cases (It should be noted that one case 
prompted great concern: this described an internist consulted about the 
asthmatic condition ofa woman seeking an abortion. Many bishops did 
not want any description of cooperation in abortion, even if the 
cooperation was licit and remote. Ironically, Evangelium Vitae 
specifically referred to an abortion case in describing licit cooperation, 
#73.). After all this disagreement, the Committee eliminated the cases 
from ERD's drafts. 
Finally the bishops decided to go back to the original version 
and together labored in the last drafts over the actual wording of the 
text. They were joined by six theologians. Then, after it was complete, 
they submitted it to their brother bishops and to the Vatican's 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. After receiving comments 
from both fora, the Committee finally submitted the last draft to the 
November 1995 NCCB assembly and received its unanimous approval. 
Thus it took the bishops six years to articulate the principle, and 
then only after broad consultation and considerable disagreement. But, 
consensus was eventually achieved in an atmosphere of mutual trust 
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and respect. That atmosphere must be promoted today among 
negotiating boards, ethicists, and chanceries, if Catholic health care is 
to survive into the next century, for the principle of cooperation is a 
major guide in the present negotiations of joint ventures, mergers and 
partnerships.5 
II. Foundational Insights for Approaching 
the Principle of Cooperation 
There are preliminary insights that we must acknowledge before 
applying the principle. The first is that cooperation is NOT a 
permitting principle, but rather a guiding principle. It provides 
guidelines for determining to what degree one should cooperate. It is 
not a "may I" cooperate principle, rather it is a guide as to "whether" 
and "how much" one should cooperate. 
We need to get away from the notion that principles permit 
activity. We look to principles as permitting all sorts of things. This 
is especially evident in our pathetic dependency on double effect. We 
ask, can we advise about condoms and AIDS? Yes, we answer, by the 
principle of double effect. Can we bomb military installations within 
civilian populations? Yes, by the principle of double effect. Can we 
apply dangerous levels of pain medication to a person dying in 
unremitting pain? Yes, double effect. Just as we have been rightly 
warned away from this knee-jerk dependency on double effect,6 we 
need to avoid a similar tendency as we become reacquainted with the 
principle of cooperation. 
Ethics is about right reasoning and right living. Only to the 
extent that a principle resonates with right reason is it right. Likewise, 
a principle can only be applied to the extent that it is rightly applied. 
Cleverly applying a principle to a situation does not make a wrong 
solution right. If we have learned anything~with our recent studies on I 
casuistry, 7 it is that we cannot look to moral principles to legitimate I 
morally questionable conduct. The rightness of one's conduct must be 
demonstrable in itself by human reason; it cannot be legitimated by 
appeal to some external general principle. Thus, the principle's 
function is rather modest: it helps to highlight the general direction 
which we ought to pursue in trying to find a morally right solution. 
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The second insight into cooperation is that it is a principle 
which we avoid as much as possible. To cooperate in the wrong-doing 
of another is something every morally good person regrets. While there 
may be morally legitimate reasons for cooperation, we must remember 
that the controlling insight in applying the principle is to cooperate as 
little as is necessary. 
Third, one of the basic reasons for cooperation is to contain evil. 
A person or an institution engages in cooperation often to minimize the 
presence of evil. Evangelium Vitae caught this intent in talking about 
the case 
where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of a 
more restrictive law, aimed a limiting the number of authorized 
abortions, in place of a more permissive law already passed or 
ready to be voted on .. . when it is not possible to overturn or 
completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official whose 
absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known 
could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by 
such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level 
of general opinion and public morality . This does not in fact 
represent illicit cooperation with an unjust law but rather a 
!egiti:nate ~d prop.:, attempt tv limil il:; t:vii aspects. (Evangeilum 
Vitae 73) 
A concrete example of this insight was actually taken by the 
NCCB when Archbishop John R. Roach and Cardinal Terence Cooke 
testified at the United States Senate in support of the Hatch amendment, 
which did not eliminate abortion, but restricted it.s The NCCB became 
involved in legislation on abortion precisely to contain this evil. 
Fourth, we cannot apply the principle mechanistically; we have 
to apply it with human reasoning. We have to deal with the specific, 
real, concrete situations which we face. It was, after all, those 
situations that gave rise to those principles. Here we can learn much 
from John Gallagher's fine essay in which he recommends that Catholic 
health care facilities get into the habit of moral discernment, that is, that 
a facility's board members become reflective agents leading the 
institution forward by profound deliberations.9 In the context of those 
deliberations, a turn to the principle of cooperation might occur. For 
people who discern well know how to use the principle. 
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III. What is the Principle of Cooperation? 
In institutional cooperation it is important to distinguish 
individual beliefs from those that the institution holds. While an 
individual might personally believe that not all fonns of birth control 
are wrong, as an employee of a Catholic health care facility, she is 
responsible for upholding the Church's teaching regarding birth control. 
Thus, personal beliefs are not the issue of institutional cooperation. 
Rather, the issues are those actions which the Church judges to be 
themselves wrongful. These include: assisted suicide, certain 
reproductive technologies that separate the unitive from the procreative, 
sterilization, direct abortion, and birth control. No Catholic health care 
institution can freely elect to perfonn any of these wrong actions. 
Nonetheless, under certain conditions an institution might consider to 
partner, merge, or enter into ajoint venture with another institution that 
does perfonn these wrong actions. For that reason, we must consider 
the basic conditions of the principle itself. 
In an act of cooperation we must distinguish five conditions, the 
first being between fonnal and material cooperation.10 The fonner is 
always wrong. It describes the stance of the cooperator as approving, 
wanting or intending the wrongdoer's action. Material cooperation, 
however, is the assistance in an act of wrongdoing without that 
approval. Thus, if a Catholic institution were ever to cooperate with 
another institution it could never fonnally cooperate, that is, it could 
never endorse the wrongful activity that the other agent provides. 
Under material cooperation, we must distinguish between 
immediate and mediate cooperation. Whereas the previous distinction 
was about our intention with regard to the cooperation, this distinction 
concerns the action itself. If the cooperation is mediated it means that 
the institution is not directly involved in the wrongful activity. 
Immediate cooperation means that the activity of the wrongdoer is 
identical with the act-ivity of the c00perator ..... While-the tradition has 
been generally willing to consider mediated cooperation, it has 
considered some instances of immediate cooperation as legitimate, but 
only under duress. 
Under mediated cooperation we are advised to be as far away 
from the activity as is possible. That is, we are to be more remote and 
less proximate. Next, the reason for the cooperation must be serious. 
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This is extraordinarily important. Since the nineteenth century, the 
tradition has used the phrase "proportionate reason" to describe this 
condition. In the case of cooperation, the term means that one only 
cooperates to the extent that something valuable is threatened and then 
the degree of cooperation depends upon how urgently that value needs 
to be protected. Unlike other contexts for the concept "proportionate 
reason", it functions in cooperation solely to protect a value, like life or 
property, that is being threatened: it is not invoked to simply promote 
something, but rather to protect something that is endangered. Thus, in 
the majority of cases of legitimate cooperation, either the source of 
one's livelihood and/or a particular dimension of the common good is 
jeopardized. Determining the value of the threatened good as well as 
determining the actual feasibility of the threat constitute tht: factors of 
this fourth condition, "proportionate reason". 
Finally, scandal arises often when we cooperate and do not 
demonstrate reasonably to our communities that our conduct is actually 
in keeping with traditionally accepted forms of behavior. The 
possibility that our communities might misconstrue what we are doing 
imposes on us the duty to help them to understand that our cooperation 
is not an approval of another'" wrong activity. Moreover, vvc have a 
responsibility to help our "weaker brothers and sisters" to understand 
that we are not undermining our tradtion, but rather protecting it. 
Especially in light of health care reform, educational efforts must 
precede the entering of new partnerships, particularly when scandal is 
likely. Our efforts must make clear that our entering into a partnership 
is to protect threatened Catholic values in health care and to contain 
wrong-doing. 
On the topic of scandal St. Paul's discernment is helpful. In I 
Corinthians 8, he raises the responsibility that stronger members have 
for their weaker members over the question of eating meat offered to 
idols. Here they are to help the brothers and sisters to see what they are 
not doing: they have an obligation to help their siblings understand that 
by eating this meat they are not acknowledging idols. If they cannot 
help these members to understand this, then they should abstain from 
the eating of idol meat altogether. But elsewhere, Paul considers 
another topic, circumcision. Here he is not at all concerned about the 
scandal of his position regarding those who insist on circumcision. 
Rather, he sees them as placing a stumbling block on the way to others 
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and rather than trying to soothe their alarm, he wishes that they would 
"mutilate themselves!" (Galatians 5:2-12). Thus, scandal cannot be 
used as a concept to hold hostage a particularly right way of 
proceeding. Rather it requires us to explain our actions as congruent 
with the tradition. 
IV. Who Cooperates? Getting 
a Sense of the Breadth of the Principle 
Two ethicists, Gennain Grisez and Russell Smith, have 
suggested that the applicability of the principle is fairly restrictive. 
Grisez wrote "Classical moral treatments of cooperation were almost 
entirely about the problems of individuals - especially servants, 
employees, and other subordinates - called upon to help superiors. II 
But this is an oversimplification. Certainly there are cases concerning 
subordinates, e.g., a messenger bearing letters between people in illicit 
relations,12 a servant continually assisting his master's attempts to 
engage in illicit relations,13 an assistant chemist working in a drug store 
which sells abortifacients,14 etc. But there are two other very different 
classes of cases of cooperation regarding participants who are not 
subordinates. The first class concerns when one has a right to perfonn 
a particular act, but others who perfonn the same act have wrong 
intentions. For instance, one considering cremation had to ask to what 
degree he was participating in the same action as the Masons. 15 
Another example concerns the wife who asks for her marriage dues 
from her husband who habitually withdraws. 16 
The other more important class of cases are those in which 
someone cooperates precisely to diminish the physically evil effects of 
another's illicit or morally wrong actions. Here, rather than being a 
question of options or rights, cooperation is a means of detennining 
whether potential catastrQPhes can somehow be averted. A classic 
example is the belt-offering wife of the husbanaintent on beating~his 
children with a baseball bat. Not participating in the moral evil, she 
cooperates to diminish the physical effects of his illicit action. Similar 
instances of material cooperation for the sake of diminishing the 
physical effects of moral evil are found in the cases of priests giving 
communion to unworthy recipients, 17 judges presiding over divorce 
cases, 18 doctors working in clinics that provide birth control instruction, 
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19 nurses assisting in illicit operations,20 etc. Effectively, in each case 
the agent asks at some point in her deliberations whether more harm 
than good could occur by her failure to cooperate materially. Clearly 
this class of actions includes the case offered by Evangelium Vitae and 
practiced by Cardinal Cooke on behalf of the NCCB. It also includes 
the case from the "Many Faces of AIDS" in which a worker in a 
Catholic health care facility tells a person who tests HIV positive that 
he should be sexually abstinent, but the patient responds that he has no 
such intention. Then, in the name of the common good, the worker 
urges the patient to use a condom.21 
Two conclusions result from this examination. First, in light of 
these cases one is hard pressed to argue that the principle of 
cooperation refers "almost entirely" to matters between subordinates 
and superiors. Second, cases regarding professionals differ 
considerably from those concerning subordinates. The cases differ 
because the former consider the question of the common good. In the 
case of subordinates, the concern is whether someone can be excused 
from any moral blame in cooperating with another because of that 
person's threats. In the cases of the judge, the priest, the doctor, the 
health care worker, the polit.ician, or the- a!"Ghhisho~, cooperation is 
invoked to contain harmful effects on the common good which result 
from another agent's actions. 
As Germain Grisez attempts to delimit cooperation to only 
"subordinates", Russell Smith attempts the exact opposite move by 
describing the cooperator as a singularly free agent. He does this by a 
clever triptych of the roles ofan accomplice, a taxpayer and a hostage.22 
He describes the accomplice as formally cooperating in the 
wrongdoing. Being as culpable as the wrongdoer, the accomplice is 
never an example of licit cooperation. The hostage on the other hand, 
without any freedom, can hardly be described as "cooperating" in the 
activity. Only the mean between these two extremes, that is, the 
taxpayer, is the quintessential cooperator: taxpaying is something no 
one wants to do, yet one is supporting a government's activity which is 
inevitably somewhere wrong. On the face of it, Smith's distinctions are 
deceptively attractive. Only the taxpayer is the paradigm cooperator; 
the other two are not. The first because he formally cooperates, the 
latter because he lacks freedom. But like Grisez, Smith has 
oversimplified the tradition, for not all cooperators are completely free 
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agents. For instance, in the case of the accomplice, certainly a free 
accomplice is always acting wrongly, but not all accomplices are free. 
To appreciate this, we should see that "accomplice" can have two 
meanings. An accomplice in intention would be one who formally 
cooperates. An accomplice in action is then an instance of immediate 
cooperation. Thus, contrary to Smith's claim, the moral theologians of 
the last three centuries have discussed immediately cooperating 
accomplices. Davis,23 with other moralists,24 judged as licit, for 
example, the case of a man under threat of death who must destroy 
another person's property. This was clearly an accomplice, but the 
accomplice was not sharing the same intention, though he was sharing 
the same action. What distinguished the accomplice from the wrong-
doer was the duress. (Clearly, anyone familiar with the case of Patricia 
Hearst and the SLA remembers similar discussions.) Such exceptions 
are noteworthy insofar as they help illustrate that the tradition did not 
make the black and white distinctions that Smith suggests; rather it 
often examined a lot of the gray areas of moral ambiguity. 
More importantly, Smith's exclusion of the other category, "the 
hostage", leads us to believe that only free agents and no subordinates 
were subjects of cooperation. Though Grisez is wrong to say that 
cooperation "almost entirely" concerned subordinates, Smith is wrong 
to exclude them entirely. The actions of subordinates, who were much 
more like hostages than they were like taxpayers, were regularly 
evaluated. In considering these subordinates, the degree of constraint 
or duress was a routine factor in weighing the legitimacy of their 
cooperation. 
In light of the fact that so few read the tradition as it was 
espoused by ethicists over the last few centuries, it is important that we 
realize that the tradition was not as narrow as others would have us 
believe. Traditional ethicists were willing to review a great breadth of 
activity by people in diverse positions of power and authority. In 
reviewing th~at-gran-d-array;-the-ethi-cists-recogn-izeEl-that reasQns-for-
cooperating differed. The slave, servant, or teenage employee were 
generally cooperating not because they were interested in protecting the 
common good; rather, they were cooperating to keep their jobs. The 
judge, priest and others were cooperating to protect the common good. 
But some who protected the common good also cooperated because 
they wanted to keep their jobs. That is, people cooperated not simply 
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for one reason, but for several. The nurse may have stayed in the 
hospital not only for her job but also because she felt that a moral 
vacuum would arise with her departure; the judge may have stayed in 
family court and still ruled on divorce cases in part to keep an 
authoritative Catholic voice in the family court, but also to keep her job 
as well. 
Both Grisez and Smith have also questioned the validity of 
applying cooperation to institutional agency, precisely because so many 
cases were originally of individuals cooperating. But history teaches 
us that just as individuals cooperate with others, similarly for centuries 
institutions have cooperated in others' wrong-doing. In fact, Roman 
Catholicism with its appreciation for institutional governance probably 
has a longer tradition of institutional cooperation than other religions 
have had. This can be seen by considering the Vatican's institutional 
engagement of other institutions. One clear instance includes the 
concordats which certainly bind the Vatican into cooperative 
endeavors, some of which entail evil. The Vatican has always astutely 
and prudently negotiated its involvement in evil, trying to use its own 
authority to contain it. But the Vatican uses its authority not only with 
concordats but in every instance where it s~nds a d~!egate, an emissary 
or an ambassador to recognize another government. The recognition of 
another regime's legitimacy, the participation in its inaugural 
receptions, and any other instances of support for another government 
is quite clearly a political act of involvement by the Vatican. Likewise, 
its involvement in international agencies is always an act of 
institutional cooperation. For instance, its important voice at the 
United Nations is not a voice of detachment, but involvement. 
Certainly in all these ways that the Vatican is involved in international 
organizations, it recognizes that there is wrong-doing to some extent 
within the practices of these organizations. Clearly, sometimes the 
wrong-doing is so unacceptable that the Vatican must withdraw its 
involvement with a particular government or with some international 
organization at the United Nations. But, for the most part, the Vatican 
remains involved, sometimes with governments and agencies that are 
clearly not promoting work that the Vatican would describe as morally 
right. For this reason one could say that the Vatican's institutional 
engagements are the proper paradigm for institutional cooperation. 
Moreover, it is not simply the Vatican, but the NCCB that also 
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engages in institutional cooperation in evil. This happens again almost 
every time that the Conference supports some particular legislation, for 
often legislation is laden with a variety of programs, not all of which 
the NCCB would call right. And, yet, it testifies in support of the laws, 
as they did for the Hatch amendment. In sum, our leaders in the 
hierarchy are probably more familiar with institutional cooperation than 
others are. They do this because they recognize the power and 
authority they have on the one hand to restrict evil and on the other, to 
protect threatened values. 
v. Why Cooperate? 
Institutional cooperation arises from those leaders of institutions 
who recognize the power and authority that they have to both restrict 
existing evil while protecting their own concerns. We have just seen 
how this applies to our bishops' activities. But I think it would be 
helpful to apply this to a more recent medical case of in vitro 
fertilization. 
In 1987 the Vatican issued the encyclical dealing with 
reproductive technology entitled Donum Vitae, which determined 
among other issues the moral unacceptability of in vitro fertilization 
because the unitive and procreative dimensions of the reproductive act 
were separated. Some moral theologians believed that the moral 
boundaries of in vitro should be drawn not with the procreative act but 
with the procreative partners.25 That is, they believed that only husband 
and wife should become father and mother and that the moralliceity of 
in vitro fertilization depended on who the partners were. Despite this 
disagreement, moral theologians were as concerned as the Vatican with 
the procedure of oocyte retrieval. This procedure is problematic 
because, due to pain, difficulty, and cost, several eggs or gametes of the 
mother must be retrieved at once. To save them, these eggs must be 
fertilized. One is implantea in the moHier, wnile tl'ie otlrers are-frozen 
and these are commonly referred to as "spares". "Spares" are available 
for later implantation in the likely event that the first implant fails. 
On the eve of Donum Vitae there were five internationally 
known Catholic health care facilities involved in in vitro fertilization. 
They were interested in facing two concerns: restricting parenthood to 
spouses and reducing the dependency on the spares. When Donum 
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Vitae was published, the Vatican expected the five Catholic 
Universities to close their in vitro facilities because of the separation of 
the unitive and procreative functions of the procedure. However, of the 
five, only the one American facility closed. The other four, all northern 
European, remained open. 
As a result, in the United States there was no longer a facility 
able to address the ethical status of spares or the pre-implanted embryo. 
Since that time the situation has worsened radically. At an in vitro 
conference that I attended three years ago, a researcher from a major 
American university explained its present procedures for in vitro. Now, 
multiple spares are implanted and, should the expectant mother not 
spontaneously abort several of the developing embryos, then the 
physicians selectively abort those extra fetuses! The process is called 
"embryo reduction". 
The absence of a major research facility working in reproductive 
technology committed to the values of embryonic and fetal life are 
strikingly apparent. The absence of a Catholic university facility · 
involved in in vitro fertilization has meant the absence of an alternative 
in which "embryonic wastage" is not taken for granted. Could not this 
American Catholic facility have found some way of cooperatillg wiih 
another facility so as to maintain its interests in promoting human life? 
Could it not have found through cooperation a way to limit embryonic 
wastage and to provide an alternative to multiple implants and selective 
abortion? The withdrawal of Catholic health care from such research 
meant also the withdrawal of a Catholic voice that could protect the 
values that the Church teaches are for aall people of good will. It could 
have championed an alternative. This is precisely why the European 
Catholic university health care facilities remained with their work. But, 
in the United States, a concern for purity helped to let the many 
problems attending in vitro to run unchecked. As a result, today in the 
United States, unlike several years ago, an embryo is more likely to be 
discarded or aborted routinely in a process that is actually pursuing 
childbirth. 
While many regret our absence, others would say, "Amen." 
Germain Grisez, for instance, maps out the complexities of cooperation 
for a Catholic institution and doubts that religious women will be able 
to avoid substantially wrongful cooperation. In a breath-takingly blunt 
article, he writes, "So, since you must avoid wrongful cooperation, you 
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should prepare to give up at least some of your hospitals and 
eventually, perhaps, all of them." He adds, "However, very likely your 
institute has experienced a decline in new members, and by now you 
are probably able to staff only a few positions in your hospitals and fill 
only a few others with Catholics who regard their work as an 
apostolate." He concludes, "I suggest that reflection of this sort 
will...point toward giving up the hospitals and adopting more suitable 
means of serving those most in need and least served by that system. ,,26 
Grisez is concerned singularly with avoiding wrong-doing. For 
that reason, he advises a withdrawal from those large health care 
facilities where we cannot avoid cooperation. Better that we not do the 
wrong. But those in ministry are not singularly involved in avoiding 
the wrong; we are as interested in containing wrong-doing. We are not 
satisfied with a self-knowledge that exculpates us from getting our 
hands dirty. That does not mean that we irresponsibly cooperate. On 
the contrary, because we believe that we should cooperate in order to 
protect threatened values, we seek to do it as rightly as possible. 
Moreover, religious women are not simply faced with the moral 
choice between divesting from their hospitals or doing evil. Rather, 
they have initiated and sustained an enormous expansion of their 
ministry: religious have brought the laity into their mission. But this 
incorporation of the laity into health care ministry is not as recent as we 
may think. True, the laity may be more recently involved in the 
administration of a facility. But religious women have brought the laity 
into their mission since the first day they hired a lay physician or nurse. 
These lay persons have found in Catholic facilities a way of pursuing 
their own ministry without finding themselves compromised elsewhere. 
Many Catholic nurses, for instance, have long believed that only at a 
Catholic hospital could they pursue ethically their work. If a religious 
order gives up its health care facility where do the hundreds of 
emQloyees go? Where are they provided the institutional support to 
continue their helpful ministry? If other fiealth care facilities are so 
morally problematic that we should not cooperate with them (as Grisez 
contends), how could a good Catholic become an employee in one? 
While the sisters give up their ministry in administration, should the 
nurses and physicians give up their ministry in health care? 
Grisez argues prophetically that we should not compromise. 
Consider, for instance, a large emerging ION where a Catholic partner 
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is in the position to be the manager but a prophetic voice says that we 
should not manage because one partner provides sterilizations. The 
money will be dirty, the sterilizations will be inevitably identified with 
the Catholic provider, and scandal will ensue.27 
But where is the scandal? In the case of the university above, 
is the scandal in the presence of a Catholic facility in in vitro research 
or in its withdrawal from that research? Is the scandal in its attempting 
to diminish the need for spares and in offering an option to women that 
does not include as a standard operating procedure selective abortion? 
Or is the scandal in not offering any alternative at all? In the face of 
moral complexity, the question of scandal is not necessarily faced by 
withdrawing one's involvement. 
VI. Duress, Immediate Material Cooperation 
and Episcopal Judgment in ERD 
In the Appendix of ERD, we find "Immediate material 
cooperation is VvTong, eX~t:pi in some instances of duress. ' j he matter 
of duress distinguishes immediate material cooperation from implicit 
formal cooperation. II About duress and immediate material 
cooperation, Russell Smith has rightly remarked that both I and the 
Reverend Thomas Kopfensteiner have argued "that duress should not 
be exaggerated to justify cooperation in wrongdoing."28 But in that 
same essay which originally was delivered to the annual Bishop's 
Workshop in Dallas, he claims that in the dossier entitled Catholic 
Health Ministry in Transition it is "repeatedly asserted that immediate 
material cooperation is permissible for proportionate reason."29 He 
calls this assertion "gratuitous" . But Smith exaggerates here. In 
reviewing that dossier, I found only one of the fourteen essays making 
the assertion. Moreover, in that essay, we find "Immediate material 
cooperation is acceptable only in some circumstances of duress when 
there is a proportionately grave reason, e.g., avoiding the abandonment 
of an indigent or poor population of persons whose access to other 
health services is limited or averting loss of Catholic presence.,,30 Later 
in a diagram, explaining the text, that statement is truncated: immediate 
material cooperation "may be acceptable for proportionate reason." But 
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that comment is prefaced by "cooperation is acceptable only in 
circumstances of duress .. ."3 \ Thus, only someone misreading the 
diagram could claim the assertion that immediate material cooperation 
was acceptable by any proportionate reason. Instead, in that carefully 
worded text, words like "only" and "duress" as well as the examples 
proposed make perfectly clear the rather rare grounds on which 
immediate material cooperation is determined to be licit. Those 
grounds are the same that can be found in the manuals. No one on 
those dossier pages was routinely advancing immediate material 
cooperation. 
As the case at the end of this essay hopefully conveys, 
immediate material cooperation can only be legitimately considered in 
extraordinary instances of duress. Duress means that one's options have 
been constrained, but to preserve something that is threatened, one may 
cooperate to protect that value. 
In an earlier essay, Smith's position on immediate material 
cooperation was unclear,32 but now he claims that teaching on duress 
has ben misunderstood and that the misunderstood notion of duress 
compromises the tradition's position on immediate material 
cooperation. Thus he first states that the tradition of immediate 
material cooperation is impermissible. But a review of the tradition 
shows exceptions like those noted above. 133 Moreover, common sense 
tells us that in the history of the Church we should be able to find 
instances wherein under duress good Catholics participated both licitly 
and immediately in wrong doing. For instance, Peter Holmes describes 
some interesting cases of ethicists who wrote during the English 
Reformation of people under duress licitly participating immediately in 
outlawed religious services.34 
Then Smith reflects on duress. Rightly, he turns to two 
documents from the mid-1970s to understand its meaning in ERD. Both 
the "Reply of the Sacred Congregation for the doctrine of the Faith on 
Sterilizations in Catholic Hospitals"35 and the USCC commentary on 
ie6 discuss the possibility of Catholic hospitals being involved in 
sterilizations. The first thing that the two documents state is that the 
Catholic health care facility cannot "approve" the sterilizations; that is, 
the cooperation can never be formal For this reason the USCC writes, 
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"In judging the morality of cooperation a clear distinction should be 
made between the reason for the sterilization and the reason for the 
cooperation .. .If the cooperation is to remain material, the reason for the 
cooperation must be something over and above the reason for the 
sterilization itself." The second thing that it does is to stipulate the 
condition for cooperation in sterilization: "Material cooperation will be 
justified only where the hospital because of duress or pressure cannot 
reasonably exercise the autonomy that it has." 
Duress appears repeatedly in these documents and Smith uses 
these as a key for interpreting ERD. From these documents he claims 
that legitimate duress is episodic and not systematic. I find this 
distinction curious, because Smith, by again introducing a conceptual 
distinction, restricts the original meaning of the concept. Tht! 
distinction that he introduces is between something temporal and 
something that is not. But duress is always temporal: it is always 
"episodic". The question, of course, is how long is the episode. 
In the tradition, duress, constraint, or pressure could be for a 
brief moment, like when one has a gun held to her head by another, or 
something more long-standing, like a person's servitude to another or 
a nation enslaved during ~n oppr€-ssive regime. In either case, the 
grounds for cooperation shift when the duress is lifted. Inasmuch as 
duress is only in effect as long as it lasts, any cooperation that is 
grounded in duress lasts as long as the duress does. Duress conditions 
the cooperation. 
Duress may be a concept that functioned for those living under 
communist rule. Once the rule ended, then the grounds for cooperation 
ended. But certainly the cooperation that is engaged is engaged because 
of the duress. In the same way, when any hospital by duress is 
pressured into sterilizations, its cooperation is not for a flashing 
moment, but rather as long as the duress exists. Likewise, just as those 
living under a regime differentiated some actions that they could 
participate in from those that they could not, similarly ERD 
distinguished the possibility of cooperatively providing sterilizations 
from the prohibition from providing abortion services (ERD, 45). 
Smith sees much in an important sentence from the 1977 
commentary to support his distinction: "In making judgments about the 
morality of cooperation each case must be decided on its own merits. 
Since hospital situations, and even individual cases, differ so much, it 
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would not be prudent to apply automatically a decision made in one 
hospital, or even in one case, to another. ,,37 But whereas he sees this as 
highlighting a normative "episodic" condition for cooperation, I see it 
as simply explaining the sentence that preceded it" "In making 
judgments about the morality of cooperation each case must be decided 
upon its own merits." The administrative board of USCC recognized 
then the complexity of such cooperation in sterilization; they did not 
suggest that each instance of sterilization must be judged as licit or not, 
but rather each health care facility's particular policy of duress and 
sterilization must be judged separately. The administrative board, then, 
was stating then that they ought not to resolve the question of 
sterilization by a simple nation or trans-diocesan policy. Rather, 
bishops were recognizing that each instance of duress and cooperation 
in sterilization ought to be prudently and locally resolved. 
The Vatican and the bishops themselves have given the 
individual bishops then the latitude to work with duress, cooperation, 
and sterilizations. Prudence requires that each bishop take a hard look 
at this. For this reason, I agree with many who say that we need to 
consider what constitutes duress in the concrete. But I think that the 
Bishops have been wise not to try to treat this issue of duress as soluble 
by some sort of general definition. On the one hand, no one wants to 
see duress used to release the floodgates by "legitimating" all forms of 
immediate cooperation for any sort of reason; on the other hand, no one 
wants to take from the bishop the authority of making a determination 
about a particular hospital and a particular policy on sterilization in his 
diocese. That's what the bishops did with their vote for ERD: they, 
with the Vatican, allowed the individual bishop the prudential 
discretion in determining duress and legitimate cooperation. 
Significantly, while the NCCB left to individual bishops the 
discretion to resolve questions concerning sterilizations, that discretion 
was not extended to questions concerning abortion. On the contrary, 
ERD explicitly stated, "Catholic health care institutions are not to 
provide abortion services, even based upon the principle of material 
cooperation." By this directive, the bishops insured that the possibility 
of providing sterilizations under duress would not become grounds for 
the possibility of providing abortion under duress. 
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VII. A Case 
We need to remind ourselves that most instances of institutional 
material cooperation are solved without any appeal to immediate 
material cooperation. But, there are some instances where it may need 
to be invoked under duress. This does not give a particular health care 
facility a blank check to provide sterilizations. Rather, the situation 
needs to be resolved prudently and specifically by the ethicists. lawyers, 
administrators and diocesan officials. To highlight the limitedness of 
the issue of duress, immediate cooperation and episcopal judgement, I 
present a case that is fairly representative of the type of immediate 
materiai cooperation at stake. 
In an American city of 100,000 inhabitants there are two 
hospitals, one community and the other Catholic. In the field of 
obstetrics, the former provides a full selection of services which the 
latter for ethical reason does not. The latter, instead, tries to protect and 
promote the values of its tradition. In renegotiating their contract with 
the Catholic administration, the obstetrics team demands a new 
piOviso: tlTt:y want permission to do tubal ligations on those women 
who want ligations while having their infant delivered through cesarian 
section. The team estimates that the number of direct sterilizations 
would be very limited. Their reasons for the proviso are simply that 
they believe it is unethical and medically ccontraindicative to "open" 
the patient twice. This team is well respected by the administration and 
is well established in the community. They are prosperous enough that 
they could move out of the facility, if they were not to receive the 
proviso. In all other matters they have acceded to the hospital and have 
regularly observed ERD. If they were to leave the Catholic health care 
facility, the facility believes it would not be able to deliver any obstetric 
services and thus would provide no alternative to the community 
facility . 
This is a case of material and not formal cooperation. Clearly 
the administration does not want any sterilizations. But the material 
cooperation is, I think, evidently immediate. Not everyone agrees; Gary 
Atkinson and Albert Moraczewski call a similar case mediate 
cooperation (but without explanation).38 Some others have claimed that 
the cooperation is mediate because the Catholic health care facility is 
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only authorizing the cesarian section; the obstetricians are insisting on 
the tubal ligations. While I think that this point could be probable, I am 
more inclined to describe the activity as immediate: I cannot imagine 
the facility claiming not to be authorizing both procedures. 
We ought to note that we are not suggesting that any kind of 
direct sterilization is being authorized here. Rather, the obstetricians 
here seem to be respecting the Catholic tradition inasmuch as they raise 
only the case of women who are already having surgery: in conscience, 
they argue, that they cannot follow ERD on this one point. 
Against this limited case of immediate material cooperation is 
the issue of duress: that is, the threatened loss of all obstetrics from the 
Catholic health care facility to this large urban area. Here then are two 
considerations. First, what would be the impact of a loss of this service 
for women? Would women find a set of values like those of the 
Catholic health care facility at the community hospital or wherever the 
obstetrics team eventually offered their services? Second, how realistic 
is the threat? Were they to carry it out, what possibility is there for the 
health care facility to rebuild a new team? Could they find a team as 
faithful to ERD as this team was and be as medically and ethically 
qualified as this team was? In sum, if the threat is real and the 
possibility of offering a real alternative is minimal, many seem to 
believe that prudence guides both the facility's administrators and the 
bishop to approve the contract. 
Scandal could be avoided by explaining the duress and the 
limited number of exceptions that are being provided. On the one hand, 
there is no blanket policy of admitting sterilizations here, rather there 
are few exceptions and these are based upon the physicians' insistence 
that it is medically contraindicative to not do a requested sterilization 
on a woman undergoing a cesarian section. On the other hand, if the 
health care facility or the bishop were to reject out of hand the contract, 
the scandal of abandoning pregnant women would be strikingly 
apparent, especially in the prevailing ethos of abortion. 
By the cooperation, the health care facility is still able to offer 
its services while promoting its Catholic values. It is not opening up 
the possibility of losing an otherwise reputable obstetric team. In fact, 
it is keeping the team faithful to ERD and the Catholic tradition 
notwithstanding the exceptional case of tubal ligations on women 
undergoing cesarian sections. Certainly the facility is not approving the 
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exceptions; rather under the duress of losing their services and therefore 
being unable to offer any comparable services to their patients, the 
Catholic facility acknowledges that it has no other alternative. 
Conclusion 
Through institutional cooperation, a Catholic health care facility 
attempts to negotiate where and to what degree it should be involved in 
the work of another facility. Catholic leaders, both in chanceries and 
in the facilities, must work in trust with one another, willing to 
recognize the fact that the tradition has not placed a stranglehold on 
their future. Rather the tradition provides for the facility a guiding 
principle that ought to help the facility maintain the integrity of its own 
Catholic identity, mission, and values. That guiding principle does not 
jeopardize the facility's integrity; on the contrary, it guides it into 
locating as specifically as possible the degree of involvement that 
thfacility should pursue, while maintaining its authority, power, and 
irrfluence by providing its seCvil;t:!S, protecting fnreatened vaiues and 
containing the evil near it. 
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